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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THOMAS PURVIS,
Appellant.

)

[1] Homicide-Instructions-Punishment for First Degree Murder.-The trial court in a first degree murder case properly
~efused defendant's request to instruct the jury that in exercising its discretion as to the appropriate penalty it was to
consider only facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or, in
the alternative, that only facts established by a preponderance
of the evidence could be considered, and that, if it entertained
a reasonable doubt as to which of the penalties to impose, the
lesser penalty should be given. The jury has absolute discretion
in fixing the penalty and is not required to prefer one penalty
over another; in evaluating the evidence the jury was bound
by the instructions given as to the limited purpose for which
certain evidence was admitted, but beyond that it could draw
its own inferences, determine the probative weight of evidence, and select the appropriate penalty on the basis of its
evaluation of the evidence.
[2] Id. - Appea.1- Harmless Error - Exclusion of Evidence.Though the distinction between the paroling of a person convicted of two first degree murders and a person convicted of
a second degree murder and then first degree murder would
seem to be too fine to justify exclusion of testimony of an
administrative officer for the Adult Authority, called by
defendant in a first degree murder ease as an expert witness
on the parole policies of the Adult Authority, as to how the
Adult Authority had dealt with Il man convicted of murder,
paroled, and then convicted of another murder, any error in
excluding the testimony was not prejudicial, since evidence
of a single example would not be sufficient by itself to show
a general practice of the Adult Authority or how it would
treat another recidivist murderer.
[3] Criminal Law-Judgment-Determination of PunishmentProcedure for Determining Penalty.-Although on trial of
the penalty phase of a first degree murder ease there may be
inquiry into relevant circumstances surrounding an earlier

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 323, 331; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§§ 501,580.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, §§ 237,238; [2] Homicide,
§ 266; [3, 5, 6] Criminal Law, § 1011.1; [4] Criminal Law, § 657.

)

94

PEOPLE tI. PURVIS

[56 C.2d

crime of which defendant was convicted, evidence of the
earlier crime must meet the rules of admissibility governing
proof of that crime or be otherwise properly admissible in
the penalty proceeding.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Declarations and Conduct Respecting Accusation.-Where defendant's response in the face of an accusatory statement is silence, evasion or equivocation, it is for thc
trial court to determine in the first instance whether the
accusation has been made under circumstances calling for a
reply, whether he understood the statement, and whether his
conduct or response was such as to give rise to an inference
of acquiescence or guilty consciousness.
[5] Id.-Judgment-Determination of Punishment-Procedure for
Determining Penalty.-On trial of thc penalty phase of a first
degree murder case, hearsay statements of defendant's second
wife, for whose death defendant was convicted of second
degree murder many years before, that she was afraid defendant was going to kill her, that he had beaten her, had held
her under water in a bathtub and deliberately burned her
thigh and vagina with a cigarette, which testimony had not
been introduced in that uxoricide trial, were not admissible
to show her state of mind; any probative value such state of
mind could have in determining the penalty for the murder
of the other victim would be far outweighed by the highly
prejudicial nature of the hearsay statements, and such statements could readily lead the jury to believe that defendant
was so depraved he deserved the death penalty.
[6] Id.-Judgment-Determination of Punishment-Procedure for
Determining Penalty.-On trial of the penalty phase of a first
degree murder ease, hearsay statements of the victim that she
was afraid of defendant because he had killed his wife were
improperly admitted where, though it might be that an inference as to the victim's conduct could be drawn from her state
of mind, no permissible inference could be drawn therefrom
as to defendant's character or actions. Standing alone, the
error might not be prejudicial but, consider~d with the error
in admitting prejudicial hearsay statements of defendant's
wife and the improper use of hearsay in the prosecutor's argument to the jury, the prosecutor having assumed that the
wife's hearsay statements established the truth of the mat.ter
asserted, the errors deprived defendant of a fair trial on the
issue of penalty and compelled reverslll.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239.
subd. (b), from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Allen G. Norris, Judge. Reversed with directions.
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, reversed with directions for retrial of question of penalty only.
Martin N. Pulich, Public Defender, James C. Hooley and
Thomas Francis Lyons, Assistant Public Defenders, for Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Arlo E. Smith and John
S. McInerny, Deputy Attorneys General, J. Frank Coakley,
District Attorney, and Frank Vukota, Deputy District Attorney, for R~spondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal is automatic from a judgment
imposing the death penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
Defendant had been found guilty of the first degree murder of
Hazel Wilson, and sentenced to death. The judgment was
affirmed on appeal insofar as it adjudged defendant guilty,
but reversed insofar as it imposed the death penalty. (People
v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871,884-887 [346 P.2d 22]). Upon retrial
the jury again fixed the penalty at death.
Defendant contends that there was reversible error in the
present proceeding because of the trial court's refusal to
give certain requested instructions, its limiting the testimony
of a defense witness, and its refusal to exclude certain hearsay
testimony, and also because of misconduct of the prosecuting
attorney.
[1] Defendant requested the trial court to instruct the
jury that in exercising its discretion as to the appropriate
penalty it was to consider only facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 He requested an alternative instruction that only
facts established by a preponderance of the evidence could
be considered. 2 He also requested the court to instruct the
'The relevant part of the requested instruction (No.9) is: "You may
consider such facts in arriving at your decision as to what is the
defendant's history and background which operate in aggraV'ation or
mitigation. However, those facts which tend to show aggravation may
only be considered by you if you are convinced, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that such facts have been proved. If you entertain a reason·
able doubt that such facts have not been proved, then you should not
consider all facts of the circumstances surrounding the crime or of the
proper penalty."
-The relevant part of requested instruction number nine alternate
SUbstitutes the words "a preponderance of evidence" for "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
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jury that if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to which of
the penalties to impose, the lesser penalty should be given.8
The court properly refused to give the requested instructions. The jury has absolute discretion in fixing the penalty
and is not required to prefer one penalty over another.
(People v~ Jones, 52 Ca1.2d 636, 648-649 [343 P.2d 577];
People v. Brice, 49 Ca1.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d 961].) In evaluating the evidence the jury was bound by the instructions
given as to the limited purpose for which certain evidence was
admitted, but beyond that it could draw its own inferences,
determine the probative weight of evidence, and select the
appropriate penalty on the basis of its evaluation of the evidence. (People v. Brust, 47 Ca1.2d 776, 787-790 [306 P.2d
480]; People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 767-768 [306 P.2d
463].)
[S] Joseph Spangler, an administrative officer for the
California Adult Authority, was called as a witness for the
defendant as an expert on the parole policies of the Adult
Authority. He testified to the median time spent in prison
by first degree murderers who had been paroled. He was then
asked whether he had any information as to the parole of a
person who had been convicted of murder, paroled, and convicted of another murder. Mr. Spangler answered that he
knew of one such person, but the trial court did not allow him
to tell the jury about that person since he had been convicted
of two first degree murders and not of a second degree murder
followed by a first degree murder. Three times the jury
returned to the courtroom to ask about parole procedure, and
at one of those times asked to have the entire transcript of
:Mr. Spangler's testimony read to them. Defendant contends
that it was proper for the jury to hear evidence as to how
the Adult Authority would deal with a man twice convicted
of murder (People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 885 [346 P.2d
22]), and that the interest of the jury in parole procedure
indicated that the court's error in excluding that evidence
was prejudicial.
"'The Court instructs you that if you entertain a reasonable doubt
as to which of the two or more punishments should be imposed, it is
your duty to impose the lesser.
"In determining which punishment shall be inllicted, you are entirely
free to act according to your own judgment.
"If any individual juror, or the jury as a whole, entertains a reason·
able doubt as to which of two or more punishments should be imposed,
it is your duty to impose the lesser of the two." (Requested instruction No. 12.)

June 1961]

)

97

The distinction between the paroling of a person convicted
of .two first degree murders and a person convicted of a
sec.ond degree murder and then first degree murder would
seem to be too fine to justify exclusion of the offered testimony.
Any error, however, in excluding the testimony was not
prejudicial, for evidence of a single example would not be
sufficient by itself to show a general practice of the Adult
Authority or how it would treat another recidivist murderer.
Over defendant's objections hearsay statements were admitted of Eleanor Purvis, defendant's second wife, for whose
death defendant had previously been found guilty of second
degree murder. Officers testified that Eleanor Purvis had
made statements to them that she was afraid defendant was
going to kill her, that defendant had beaten her, had held her
under water in a bathtub, and deliberately burned her thigh
and vagina with a cigarette. None of this testimony had been
introduced at defendant's trial in 1950 for the murder of
Eleanor Purvis~
[3] Although there may be "inquiry into relevant circumstances surrounding an earlier crime of which the defendant was convicted" (People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 881 [346
P.2d 22]), evidence of the earlier crime must meet the rules
of admissibility governing proof of that crime or be otherwise
properly admissible in the penalty proceeding. The attorney
general contends that some of the hearsay statements of
Eleanor Purvis can be admitted against defendant as his
adoptive admissions. There was conflicting testimony whether
defendant was present when the statements were made.
[4] Even if he were present, "Where his response,is silence,
evasion, or equivocation, it is for the trial court to determine
in the first instance whether the accusation has been made
under circumstances calling for a reply, whether the accused
understood the statement, and whether his conduct or response
was such as to give rise to an inference of acquiescence or
guilty consciousness." (People v. Simmons, 28 Ca1.2d 699,
712 [172 P.2d 18] ; see People v. Davis, 43 Cal.2d 661, 670
[276 P.2d 801] ; McBaine, California Evidence Manual2d ed.,
§ 934.) There is no evidence that would support such a determination. Furthermore there were no instructions given to
the jury 011 evaluating adoptive admissions.
The Attorney General invokes People v. Merkouris, 52
Ca1.2d 672, 682 [344 P.2d 1], and People v. Atchley, 53 Ca1.2d
160. 172 [346 P.2d 764], for the proposition that the hearsay
statements were admissible to show the state of mind of
56
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. Eleanor Purvis. In the Merkouris ease, the victims' statements indicating fear of the defendant were admitted to
identify the defendant as the killer. In the Atchley ease,
. the statement was admissible on the issue of self-defense.
In the trial for the murder of Eleanor Purvis neither the
identification of defendant as the killer nor a claim of selfdefense was in issue. Nor had defendant put in issue any
other fact to which the hearsay statements were relevant.
Defendant's defense in that trial was that he acted without
premeditation and was therefore guilty of second degree
murder only. Thus, even on the issue of guilt the state ·of
mind of the victim would not have been relevant. [ 5 ] In
the present case the hearsay statements of Eleanor Purvis
were admitted, not merely to establish defendant's guilt of her
murder but to influence the jury in a separate proceeding to
determine the penalty for a subsequent murder. In determining the penalty for the murder of Hazel Wilson the state of
miud of Eleanor Purvis has no probative value. Certainly
any probative value it could conceivably have would be far
outweighed by the highly prejudicial nature of the hearsay
statements. Eleanor Purvis did not merely say she feared
defendant. She related beatings and acts that could readily
lead the jury to believe that defendant was so depraved he
deserved the death penalty.
[6] Defendant contends that certain hearsay statements
of Hazel Wilson were also improperly admitted. Witnesses
testified that Hazel Wilson had told them that she was afraid
of defendant because he had killed his wife. In the trial for
the murder of Hazel Wilson defendant also claimed that he
had killed without premeditation. There was no issue of
either identification or self-defense. There was thus no ground
on which Hazel Wilson's fear of defendant could be admitted
even to prove defendant's guilt let alone to aid the jury in
fixing the penalty. It may be that an inference as to the
victim's conduct can be drawn from the victim's state of
mind, but certainly no permissible inference can be drawn
therefrom as to defendant's character or actions. Standing
alone, the error in admitting this evidence might not be prejudicial. Considered, however, with the error in admitting the
highly prejudicial hearsay statements of Eleanor Purvis and
the improper use of the hearsay in the prosecutor's argument :
to the jury the conclusion is inescapable that the purpose of
introducing such testimony was to inflame the jury against
defendant.
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Thc prosecutor argued to the jury as if the hearsay statements of Eleanor Purvis established the truth of the matter
asserted, although those statements had been admitted only
to show her state of mind toward defendant. In both his
opening and closing arguments the prosecutor stated that
defendant would take lighted cigarettes and burn Eleanor
Purvis' thighs and her vaginal tract. These highly inflammatory statements of defendant's conduct could only have been
made to persuade the jury that defendant was such a depraved
person he deserved the death penalty. The prosecutor's argument thus served to compound the original error in admitting
these hearsay statements. Even if. they could be admitted to
show Eleanor Purvis' state of mind, the prosecutor's assumption in his argument that they were true would far exceed
the bounds of proper argument. Particularly when guilt has
been established and the question is one of life imprisonment
or death must strict standards of fairness be observed. The
serious errors both in the admission of evidence and the
highly prejudicial misconduct of the prosecutor in his argument to the jury. deprived defendant of a fair trial on the
issue of penalty and therefore compel a reversal. The judgment
imposing the death penalty is reversed, and the cause is
remanded. for retrial and redetermination of the question of
penalty only and for the pronouncement of a new sentence
and judgment in accordance with such determination and the
applicable law.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-For reasons
hereinafter explained I concur in the judgment but in the
interest of more helpful and accurate guidance of the trial
court on the new trial (this is a second reversal) I would
modify the majority opinion in certain respects. I would
amend and augment the opinion to more adequately define (for
instruction of the jury at the penalty stage of a trial) the
difference between the burdens of (a) proof and (b) persuasion in, respectively, (1) the process of evaluating conflicting evidence to determine whether the existence of particular
facts has been proved and (2) the process of exercising absolute discretion to determine the ultimate issue of selecting the
penalty. Furthermore, I think a reading of the transcript
demonstrates the untenability of, and I would delete, the holding that •• There is no evidence that would support . . . a

)
.~
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determination" that any of the hearsay statements of Eleanor
Purvis were admissible.
In more detail, my views in this matter and the reasons
therefor, are as follows:
Defendant's first requested instruction as to burden of
proof at the penalty stage of the triaP was properly refused
because it would have required that facts in aggravation of
punishment be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and would
have left the jury uninstructed as to whether there was any
burden of proof of facts in mitigation. Similarly, defendant's
alternative requested instruction on the subject2 would have
created the erroneous impression that, while the jury could
consider aggravating facts only if they were proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, therc was no burden of proof
IlS to mitigating facts.
As the majority say (ante, p. 96 [13 Cal.Rptr. 803, 362
P.2d 715]), "The jury has absolute discretion in fixing
the penalty and is not required to prefer one penalty over
another." And at the penalty stage of trial there is-no burden
of producing evidence. The instructions given here apprised
the jury of these concepts,S but did not tell them about any
burden of persuasion, or risk of nonpersuasion, of facts.
In my opinion there is a burden of proof of facts, if either
party seeks to prove them, at the penalty stage of trial as in
any other adversary proceeding; and there is a difference
'The relevant part of the instrnction (quoted by the majority also
in their f.n. 1) is: "those facts which tend to show aggravation may
only be considered by you if you are convinced, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that such facts have been proved. If you entertain a reasonable
doubt that sucll facts have not been pro'l"ed, then you SllOUld not consider such facts in arriving at your decision as to what is the proper
penalty." (Italics added.) The italicized "not" appears to have been
inserted by clerical error.
'The pertinent part of such instruction is: "those facts which tend
to show aggravation may only be considered by you if you are eonyinced that such facts have been proved by a preponderance of evidence. If you are not convinced that sueh facts are proved by a
preponderance of evidence then you should not consider them in arriving at your decision as to what is the proper penalty."
"The jury were told:
"In determining which punishment shall be inflicted, you are entirely
free to act according to your own judgment and absolute discretion.
The discretion of determining which punishment shall be imposed is
vested in the jury alone. In this determination it is your duty to
conscientiously consider all of the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history and
of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty which hnve
been presented to you here in court, weiglling and considering the
evidenc.e under the applicable rule of law which was given to you in
the Court's instructions in this ease. [As stated, there was no instruc·
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between the process of the jury's evaluating conflicting evidence to determine whether the existence of particular facts
have been proved, and thc process of their exercising absolute
discretion to determine the ultimate issue of selecting thc
. penalty.
The trier of the issue of penalty does not have to find the
existence of mitigating circumstances in order to select the
punishment of life imprisonment, or the existence of aggravating circumstances in order to fix the punishment at death.
The ultimate determination need not rest on the resolution
of any question of fact in the traditional sense in which such
questions are usually presented in a lawsuit. The selection
of penalty may be based on matters such as the following,
which are not proved as facts but rest in the judgment and
consciences, the minds and hearts, of the jury; "considerations of the several objectives of punishment, of the deterrence of crime, of the protection of society, of the desirability
of stern retribution, or of sympathy or clemency . . . or of
the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of death, or an
apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have
not been brought to light . . . . " (People v. Friend (1957),
47 Cal.2d 749, 768 [306 P.2d 463] ; People v. Jones (1959),
52 Ca1.2d 636, 649 [7] [343 P.2d 577].)
Although a jury could properly, for example, disbelieve
all the evidence introduced by the People in aggravation,
believe all the evidence introduced by the defendant in mitigation, and yet impose the death penalty because of "extraevidentiary" factors such as those just recited, I think its
original evaluation of the evidencc (before it reached its final
task of selecting punishment) would have to be guided by
the concept of burden of proof. I know of no other manner
in which the evidence could be weighed, and I doubt that
anyonc would contend that at the penalty stage of trial the
evidence could bc arbitrarily ignored.
It has been held that where the selection of penalty is madc
by the jury, the proceeding should be a trial in the full
Hon concerning weighing the evidence as to the existence of particular
facts in the light of any burden of proof.] ...
"The choice as between the two penalties is in every ease committed
to the jury's absolute discretion .•.•
"With respect to the penalty, no burden of proof is east upon tho
People or the Defendant to show by any particular quantum, that is
amount, of evidence which penalty should be imposed by 3'0u. You
are further instructed that you must agree unanimously on the penalty
which is to be imposed in this partirulnr ease, which unanimous deeilion .honld be indicated by your verdict." (Italics added.)

)
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technical sense, governed by the same rules of procedure as
the trial of the issue of guilt. (People v. Purtlis (1959), 52
Cal.2d 871, 883-884 [12] [346 P.2d 22]; People v. Green
(1956),47 Cal.2d 209, 236 [16] [302 P.2d 307].) That holding concerned the requirement that only competent evidence
be received, but to me it also contemplates the concept of
burden of proof-although not the same burden which is
imposed on the People at thc trial of the issue of guilt, when
there is a presumption of defendant's innocence-and instructions explaining the applicable burden.
In the present case, the People presented evidence of instances of reprehensible conduct of defendant antedating and
apart from the subject murder, and the defendant presented
evidence that those instances did not occur. Before the jury
could intelligently decide-in their absolute discretion, to be
sure-what penalty defendant should sufier, they would have
to determine whether the aggravating events took place. That
determination, I think, should have been made under guidance of instructions that the People had the burden of proving
aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence. And
where defendant presents evidence of mitigating circumstances
I think the jury should be told that he has the burden of
proving such circumstances by a similar preponderance.
I am further of the opinion that the jury should have been
instructed that if they entertained a reasonable doubt as to
which penalty should be imposed, they should select the lesser.
Such an instruction (which would accord with a dictum in
People v. Oancino (1937), 10 Ca1.2d 223, 230 (3] [73 P.2d
1180] ), would not concern the burden of proof of issues of
fact. Rather, it would be a proper application of the more
general rule that "The defendant is entitled to the benefit of
every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question
of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute." (In re Tartar
(1959), 52 Ca1.2d 250, 257 [10] [339 P.2d 553].) The instruction requested by defendant in this regard,' however,
"The requested instruction (quoted by the majority in their f. n. 3)
is:
"The Court instructs you that if you entertain a reasonable doubt
as to which of the two or more punishments should be imposed, it is
your duty to impose the lesser.
"In determining which punishment aha11 be in:fticted, you are entirely
free to act according to your own judgment.
"If tmy i7ldividllaZ juror, or the jury as a whole, entertains a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more punishments ahould be imposed,
it is your duty to impose the lesser of the two." (Italics added.)

)
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could not properly have been given in its entirety, for its
last paragraph would have incorrectly told the jury that if
a single juror had a reasonable doubt as to which punish. ment should be inflicted, it would be the duty of the entire
. jury to yield to his opinion and impose the lesser penalty.
Rather, in such a situation, it would be the duty of the jury
to report to the trial judge their inability (if such was the
fact) to reach a unanimous verdict on the issue of penalty.
The judge should then CCdismiss the jury and either impose
the punishment for life in lieu of ordering a new trial on
the issue of penalty, or order a new jury impaneled to try
the issue of penalty." (Pen. Code, § 190.1.)
I am also not entirely in accord with the majority's discussion of the testimony of police officers who related the
contents of accusatory statements made by defendant's wife
Eleanor on various occasions during the six months prior to
her murder by defendant on February 6, 1950. The evidence
would support a determination that on one or two occasions
when Eleanor stated that defendant had struck her or bruised
her, defendant was present and did not deny the accusations.
I (lannot agree with the majority (ante, p. 97) that there
is no evidence which would support a determination that
those accusations were understood by defendant and made in
circumstances calling for a reply, and that defendant's failure
to deny them could give rise to an inference that he admitted
their truth. Eleanor's statements were made to police officers
who had been summoned by a report of a cc family disturbance"; certainly such a situation would normally call for
some reply by the asserted creator of the disturbance. There
is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant lacked
ordinary capacity to understand the accusations (his own
testimony belies such a suggestion) or that his silence was
the result of coercion. In the circumstances I find no prejudice in the lack of literal compliance with the foundational
requirement that the trial judge determine "in the first
instance" whether the accusations were made in a situation
which would support an inference of admissions by silence
(People v. Simmo'M (1946), 28 Ca1.2d 699, 712 [6a] [172
P.2d 18]) or in the failure to instruct the jury concerning
such admissions.
I agree that the more damaging statements that defendant
held Eleanor's head under water and deliberately burned
her with a cigarette were inadmissible hearsay. There is no
evidence that defendant was present when Eleanor made
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these accusations and their scope went far beyond that necessary to show a relevant state of mind of the victim. People v.
Merkouris (1959), 52 Cal.2d 672, 682 [10-12] [344 P.2d 1],
should not be extended (and People v. Feasby (1960), 178
Cal.App.2d 723, 733-734 [14-17] [3 Cal.Rptr. 230] should not
'be construed) to permit the introduction in evidence, without
discrimination, of all sorts of accusations against a defendant
by the victim of a homicide, upon the theory that the victim's
state of mind is relevant.
However, I cannot agree with the broad statement of the
majority (ante, p. 98) that in the trial of defendant for
the murder of Eleanor •• on the issue of guilt the state of
mind of the victim would not have been relevant." In that
trial the prosecution might not have foreseen that the sole
defense would be an attempt to show that defendant killed
without premeditation. Defendant's plea of not guilty put
in issue the identity of the killer as well as every element
of the crime of murder. (Pen. Code, § 1019.) I am not prepared to say, on the basis of hindsight,that because defendant
did not, at the trial for Eleanor's murder, testify that he
was not the killer, therefore the prosecution could not have
proved Eleanor's fear of defendant, by her declarations
appropriately limited (see People v. Burton (1961), 55
Ca1.2d 328, 348-349 [20-22] [11 Cal.Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d
433J), in order to show the probability that she was killed
by defendant rather than some unidentified third person.
Also I am not prepared to say that evidence that a previous
wife, particularly one killed by defendant, feared him for
some time before her death, has no probative value in the
determination of penalty for the subsequent killing of a
paramour. But in the instant case the manner in which the
district attorney used the statements of Eleanor suggests
that he deliberately presented inadmissible hearsay concerning prior depraved conduct of defendant, with full awareness
of the impropriety of such evidence. The prosecuting attorney
should have known when he made his opening statement what
the tenor of the testimony of the experienced police officers
would be. Certainly at the end of the taking of evidence,
after repeated colloquies among the trial judge and counsel
concerning the matter, the prosecutor knew that he had not
presented any admissible evidcnce that defendant attempted
to drown Eleanor and burned her with a cigarette on occasions
prior to her murder. Yet both the prosecution's opening
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statement and its closing arguments assumed the truth of the
subject hearsay.
On almost every occasion when the officers' testimonies
as to Eleanor's declaration were given the trial judge was
commendably careful to instruct the jury that the evidence
was received only to show her state of mind and not to show
the truth of other facts declared by her. But in the circumstances I do not believe that the admonitions of the judge
could cure the prejudicial effect of the incompetent evidence.
I do not imply that I think the penalty selected by the jury
is not fully warranted by the properly admitted and competent evidence. In an ultimate sense, if we could consider
only the admissible evidence and the verdict, we should
properly conclude that no miscarriage of justice appears.
But such a limited consideration of the record does not meet
California's standard of justice. The elements of procedural
due process are as essential to a valid judgment as is proof
of the facts constituting the crime. If any evidence on the
issue of penalty is to be received it must be competent evidence,
not prejudicial hearsay. I agree with the majority that the
compounding of error in receiving incompetent evidence and
the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney require reversal
and remand for a new trial on the sole issue of penalty.
McComb, J., concurred.

